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Abstract
Depression and dysphoria have often been cited as emotional states that 
exacerbate both body size distortion and body dissatisfaction. The specific cause of this 
association has recently been the subject of empirical investigation. In fact, recent 
research suggests that women induced into a negative mood state report increased 
concern about their body image. The role of cognition, however, has not yet been 
specifically addressed by these investigations. The present study tested whether self­
referent cognition acts as a mediator between subjective mood and body image 
evaluations. Eighty women were induced into either a positive or negative mood through 
brief exposure to either a self-referent or a non self-referent mood induction procedure 
(MIP). Self-evaluations for attitudinal and perceptual body image were examined for 
differential effects related to these MIPs. Results indicated that attitudinal body image 
self-evaluations and perceptual estimates of actual body size became more derogatory 
only after exposure to the negative MIP that was self-referent. Participants exposed to 
the positive self-referent MIP, as well as the negative non self-referent MIP, showed an 
overall unexpected trend toward improved self-evaluations on these measures. 
Participants who initially reported high self-esteem also showed a decrease in self-esteem 
after exposure to the negative self-referent MIP. These collective results support the 
cognitive priming perspective, which posits that cognitive sets, and not subjective mood 
per se, are responsible for the more negative self-evaluations reported after exposure to 
negative MIPs. The implications of the study’s findings for cognitive theories are 
discussed.
i
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Does Self-Referent Cognition act as a Mediator between 
Mood and Body Image?
Body image is a topical construct popular in both culture and in psychological 
research. Numerous researchers have described the pervasive and sometimes harmful 
effects that body image concerns can have on an individual, including the potential for 
development of an eating disorder. Determining an operational definition of body image 
for psychological purposes is difficult for the term acts as an umbrella construct under 
which a great deal of varied research has been completed. The present study closely 
followed Cash and Pruzinsky's (1990) conception of body image. They define it as a 
multifaceted construct associated with a persons’ perceptions, thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviours regarding the appearance of one's body.
Body image has also been conceived of as a mental construction that is 
encompassed within a person’s self-schema (Markus, Hamill, & Sentis, 1987). As such, 
body image is a subjective evaluation that can deviate substantially from the person's 
objective physical characteristics. Consistently negative body image evaluations that are 
salient descriptors of an individual’s sense of self can lead to the development of body 
image disturbances. Thompson (1992) describes body image disturbance, which is 
closely aligned with Cash and Pruzinsky’s (1990) definition of body image, as a 
multifaceted disorder related to physical appearance that includes affective, cognitive, 
perceptual, and behavioural components.
Depression is a common clinical feature associated with body image 
disturbances (Cooper & Taylor, 1988). A significant association has been found 
between depression levels of patients with anorexia nervosa and their extent of body size
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
overestimation (Garfinkel & Gamer, 1984). Another study (Freeman, Thomas, Solyon, 
& Miles, 1983) investigated perceptual disturbances of body size for patients with 
bulimia nervosa and found that depression was significantly associated with a high 
discrepancy between participants' perceived and desired body size. Body image 
perceptual disturbances have also been found to be related to low mood among women 
with no clear eating disorder (Cash, Winstead, & Janada, 1986; Fallon & Rozin, 1990).
Researchers have recently begun to investigate the association between 
dysphoric mood and body image disturbances. Three studies to date have investigated 
this association by experimentally manipulating mood and examining resulting changes 
on certain dimensions of body image. Taylor and Cooper's (1992) examined the effect 
of a negative mood induction on body size perception. Plies and Florin (1992) studied 
the effect of mood inductions on the body image of restrained eaters. Finally, Baker, 
Williamson, and Sylve (1995) investigated the effects of mood inductions on body 
image disturbances and memory biases. The methods and results of these studies will be 
examined and important similarities and discrepancies will be highlighted.
Taylor and Cooper (1992) investigated both a perceptual and an attitudinal 
dimension of body image. The perceptual measure required female participants to 
estimate both their actual body size and desired body size, before and after either a 
negative or neutral MIP. Velten’s (1968) MIP was adapted for this study. The Velten 
uses self-referent statements that describe either positive self-evaluations “ I feel that I 
am a nice person" or negative self-evaluations “ I feel ashamed of things I've done". A 
visual analogue scale, developed to measure transient changes in mood, was used to 
compare participants’ mood ratings pre- and post-MIP. Participants finished the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
experiment by filling out the Body Shape Questioimaire (BSQ; Cooper, Taylor, Cooper, 
& Fairbum, 1987), an attitudinal scale that assesses body dysphoria.
The MIP procedure had a significant effect on perception of body size. 
Participants in the low mood condition, which successfully manipulated mood, showed a 
significantly smaller desired size compared with participants in the control condition.
For estimates of actual size, however, Taylor and Cooper stated that participants in the 
low mood condition showed a tendency to overestimate their actual size, F(l, 70) =
1.37, p.> .10, compared to participants in the control condition.
An index of body size dissatisfaction was derived by subtracting participant 
ratings of their desired size from estimates of their actual size. Analysis of this index 
indicated that participants in the low mood condition were significantly more 
dissatisfied with their body image compared with participants in the control condition.
Taylor and Cooper re-analysed the data using a median split on BSQ scores to 
compare participants high and low in body shape concern. Results indicated that 
compared to participants low in body shape concern, for those with high body shape 
concern the induction of low mood led to a statistically significant increase in body size 
overestimation. Although not statistically significant, participants with high body shape 
concerns in the low mood condition showed a tendency towards greater body size 
dissatisfaction compared to low body shape concerned females.
A potential confounding factor in this study was that the BSQ was completed 
after the MIPs. This ordering of tasks did not allow for an accurate baseline measure of 
body shape concern independent of mood effects. A better research design would 
require participants to complete the BSQ before any mood manipulation. Despite these
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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limitations, this study helped to elucidate the connection between mood and certain 
elements of body image disturbances.
Plies and Florin's (1992) experiment investigated both perceptual body image 
and body dissatisfaction through a questionnaire. Their results largely support those of 
Taylor and Cooper (1992). Plies and Florin's experimental design divided female 
participants into two groups prior to any experimental manipulation; restrained eaters 
(RE) and unrestrained eaters (URE). The participants were subjected to a sequence of 
three conditions under which their body image was assessed: baseline, induction of 
negative mood, and finally induction of positive mood. Under each condition, the 
participants were asked to estimate their actual body width. Participants were 
administered the BSQ after the mood induction and body size estimates had been 
completed.
Rather than using the Velten, Plies and Florin’s MIP procedure manipulated 
mood through recall of autobiographical events of either positive or negative content. 
Once these events were recalled, participants were encouraged to try and re-experience 
their emotional quality. A Liken scale administered at baseline and after each mood 
induction asking participants to rate their agreement with the statement “1 feel sad ” 
suggested that the MIPs were effective in altering mood. Mood effects were equal for 
the RE and URE groups. Plies and Florin's results for body image evaluations share 
some overlap with Taylor and Cooper’s (1992) study. Overall, RE gave significantly 
higher estimations o f their body width than URE. However, both groups reported higher 
estimates of their body width under the negative mood condition than after both baseline 
and positive mood induction. Interpretation o f body image dissatisfaction scores, which 
were measured by the BSQ, was likely confounded by the study’s experimental design.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The within-subjects design, which required participants to evaluate their body image 
under both a negative and positive mood, does not allow for a clear understanding of a 
specific mood effect on this attitudinal variable.
Baker, Williamson, and Sylve (1995) examined three aspects of body image 
disturbance in their research design. The first aspect, body dysphoria, represented 
negative feelings about one's body size or shape. The second aspect, body 
dissatisfaction, was defined as a disparity between a person's perceived current body size 
and his or her ideal body size. The third aspect was body size perceptual distortion. The 
BSQ was used as a screening measure to select and divide female participants into 
groups high and low on body image dysphoria. It is important to note that groups 
differed on levels of depression before any experimental manipulation. Participants with 
high body dysphoria had higher Beck Depression Inventory (BDl; Beck, Steer, &
Garbin, 1988) scores than low body dysphoric participants. Baker et al. (1995) stated 
that they did not believe that this difference was important to the findings of interest in 
their study. However, the argument can be made that when the experimental 
manipulation targets mood, baseline group differences on levels of depression are 
relevant.
An initial screening session required participants to complete a package of 
measures. This package included the Eating Disorders Inventory (EDI; Gamer, 
Olmstead, & Polivy, 1983), which includes a sub-scale assessing body dissatisfaction; a 
perceptual measure, and the Body Image Assessment Scale (BIAS; Williamson, 1989), 
which uses silhouettes of female body shapes ranging from very thin to obese. This 
scale assesses current body size, ideal body size, and the disparity between ideal and 
current body size. The BDl and the BSQ were also administered.
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A week or two after the screening session selected participants returned to the 
laboratory and were asked to rate their mood using a Subjective Units of Distress Scale 
(SUDS; Wolpe & Lazarus, 1967), and the Depressive Adjectives Checklist(DACL; 
Lubin, 1967). Each group of participants was randomly assigned to either the negative 
or neutral mood induction condition and then reassessed on the SUDS and DACL to 
evaluate mood change. Mood was manipulated via a Velten-type MIP, which required 
participants to read either 30 negative or neutral self-referent statements. The dependent 
measures of interest, the BIA, BSQ, and the body dissatisfaction scale o f the EDI, were 
subsequently administered to determine the impact of the induced mood.
Analysis of the SUDS and DACL scores indicated significantly more dysphoric 
affect at post-MIP, which suggests that the procedure was effective. Groups did not 
differ in their responses to the neutral mood induction. Analysis of the body image 
measures at post-MIP provided further support for the associative link between affect 
and body image evaluations. Current body size (CBS) estimates yielded a significant 
Group X Mood interaction, with high body dysphoric participants evidencing higher 
CBS estimates in the negative mood condition when compared with the neutral 
condition. Low body dysphoric participants did not differ on CBS scores when the two 
mood conditions were compared. However, estimations of ideal body size were not 
affected by the negative MIP for participants in either low or high body dysphoria 
groups. This apparent stability of participants’ ideal body size estimates contrasts with 
the results of Taylor and Cooper (1992) who reported that participants in a negative 
mood condition showed significantly smaller desired size compared to participants in a 
control condition.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
A significant interaction for Group x Mood condition was also found for BSQ 
scores. Participants high in body dysphoria in the negative mood induction had higher 
BSQ scores than those in the neutral mood condition. Participants low in body 
dysphoria, however, did not report increased body dysphoria in the negative mood 
condition when compared to the control condition. No Group x Mood interaction was 
found for the EDI Body Dissatisfaction scale. Although the lack of group differences 
for body dissatisfaction contrasts with the conclusions proposed by Taylor and Cooper 
(1992), one must remember that Taylor and Cooper used perceptual estimations, an 
index of perceived size minus ideal size, as a measure body size dissatisfaction.
Similarities and differences of the three studies reviewed (Baker, Williamson, & 
Sylve, 1995; Plies & Florin, 1992; Taylor & Cooper, 1992) are important to summarize. 
Mood induction procedures were shown to be effective in altering mood in each study. 
Only female participants were used and they were divided into groups high and low on 
some measure of body image concern. For participants low in body image concerns, 
mood change did not result in changes in body image self-evaluations. One exception to 
this overall trend was that unrestrained eaters in Plies and Florin’s study (1992) made 
significantly higher actual body estimates after a negative mood induction. A possible 
explanation of this result is that females who were not restraining their eating may, 
nevertheless, still have had high levels of body concern but these concerns were not 
being expressed in their behaviour. For participants with high body image concerns, 
negative mood was shown to influence some aspect of perceptual estimations in each of 
the three studies. Consistent results were not found for the impact o f mood on body 
image dissatisfaction. This lack of consistency may be explained by the use of different 
measures. Taylor and Cooper (1992) used perceptual measures while Plies and Florin
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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(1992) and Baker et al. (1995) used attitudinal measures to operationally define body 
image dissatisfaction. Another potential factor to explain inconsistent findings among 
the studies was the use of research designs that did not allow for a clear examination of 
mood effects on body image evaluations.
Stability of the self-schema
How does one explain the observed shifts in body image evaluations 
demonstrated by the three experiments? For certain individuals, induction of a negative 
mood state is associated with an increased concern in body image perceptions and 
attitudes. This apparent instability of the body image construct, which is an integral part 
o f an individuals’ self-schema, runs counter to a recent review of schema research in 
depression (Rector, Segal, & Gemar, 1998). This review defines self-schema as a 
relatively stable body of stored knowledge which pertains to aspects of the self. This 
definition does allow for some flexibility and perhaps “relative” factors exist which 
affect the stability of body image. Myers and Biocca’s (1992) conception of body image 
is aligned with this consideration. They view body image as an elastic construct that is 
unstable and responsive to external cues such as media exposure and social influences. 
Further support for the notion of an elastic body image has been offered by Markus and 
Nurius (1986) who argue that while self-schema research usually assumes that an 
individual's self-concept is a stable structure, it is also possible that self-schema are 
influenced by more momentary variations in external circumstances and internal states.
Myers and Biocca (1992) suggest that mood may be a potential factor 
influencing body image. This explanation seems plausible in light of the experimental 
manipulation o f mood used in the three studies reviewed. However, could there be other 
factors or internal states that could have an influence on body image concerns? Recall
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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that in addition to “feelings”, “thoughts” are also an important aspect in the definition of 
body image (Cash & Pruzinsky, 1990). Cognition represents an additional internal state 
that has been argued to influence peoples’ self-schemas (Beck, 1976; Riskind, 1989; 
Segal, Gemar, Truchon, Guirguis, & Horowitz, 1995). Perhaps cognition represents a 
factor that affects the relative stability of one’s self-schema, in particular one’s body 
image.
Subjective Mood Versus Cognitive Priming
Two opposing theoretical perspectives, mood-based versus cognitive priming, 
have been developed to account for the observed effects of mood on memory. These 
perspectives offer different explanations for the results of the three mood induction 
experiments reviewed (Baker et al., 1995; Plies & Florin, 1992; Taylor & Cooper, 1992) 
The mood-based perspective proposes that subjective mood, or “feeling”, is the causal 
factor influencing memory, whereas the cognitive priming perspective proposes that 
“thoughts” are the cause of the observed effects (e.g., Riskind, 1989).
The mood-based perspective is largely predicated on the theoretical conception 
of mood-congruency effects. This conception posits that mood states act as cues for 
selective recall of mood-congruent information. Participants with significant body 
image dysphoria are argued to have fluctuating perceptions and attitudes concerning 
their body. These conceptions may lie on a range fix>m good to bad. A mood-congruent 
effect would occur if a subjective negative mood activates the related negative body 
image evaluations. Participants without body image concerns may possess more stable 
body image conceptions and, therefore, the negative mood has no corresponding 
negative body image evaluation. Riskind (1989) argues that although the mood-based 
perspective is “theoretically elegant”, a substantial amount of research provides
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
contradictory results. Most damaging is the observation that in mood-induction 
studies, mood change and memory change are frequently not correlated (Riskind, 1989; 
Blaney,1986). The lack of consistent correlations between mood and memory argues 
against the mood-based perspective’s basic premise of congruency between mood state 
and selective recall and retrieval.
The cognitive priming perspective argues that, independently of subjective 
mood, the cognitive information provided by mood-evoking events can directly prime 
memory. As such, mood-incongruent memory results are accounted for by the process 
of cognitive priming that accompanies mood-producing events. Riskind (1989) 
summarizes this discussion in context of schema theory;
Firstly, when individual schemas or categories are primed by a 
mood-induction, such priming would enhance retrieval of 
schema-congruent material. Second, priming by a mood- 
producing event may increase the encoder’s readiness to elaborate 
schema- or category-congruent material. Accordingly, the 
cognitive priming of schemas or categories can enhance learning 
of congruent material and explain mood congruent encoding 
effects as well. In contrast to the mood-based perspective, in the 
cognitive priming perspective, the subjective mood state induced 
by a mood-inducing event may not mediate either mood 
congruent encoding or retrieval, (p. 175.)
10
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Further support for the causal effects of cognition on self-schemas is derived 
from Beck’s (1967, Beck et al., 1979) cognitive theory which argues that depressogenic 
schemas remain latent until triggered by stressful life events which mirror the content of 
the schema. Many negative themes are made accessible by this activation of self-schema 
which then create a pattern of negative self-reference information that induces 
depression. Cognition has been argued to include verbal and “visual” representations of 
the nature of the self (Riskind, 1989). One can readily see the connection between 
perceptual estimations of body size and visual representations of the self. Lazurus (1982) 
has argued that cognition is not always conscious and may frequently be evaluative. This 
assumption establishes an explicit connection between cognition and body image 
evaluations.
Does evidence exist in the literature that supports or refutes one o f these opposing 
theoretical perspectives? Beck’s (1967; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979) cognitive 
theory refers to self-referencing information and it is this aspect of cognition which has 
been used to clarify the results of mood and memory studies. Rholes, Riskind, and Lane 
(1987) report somatic statements that describe bodily sensations associated with 
depression are as effective in changing mood as negative self-referencing statements but 
the latter are more effective in facilitating access to emotional memories. Furthermore, 
negative self-referencing statements can still promote access to emotional memories even 
when they fail to produce negative affect change.
Brown and Taylor (1986) offer support for the increased availability of personally 
relevant material. They reported that after inducing participants into either a negative or 
positive mood via a self-referencing MIP, mood-congruent encoding effects for 
participant ratings o f negative or positive personality trait adjectives were found only if a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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self-referent rating task was used (i.e., “Does this word describe you?”). If participants 
were asked to make non-self-referencing, phonemic ratings (rhyming), the mood- 
congruency encoding effects disappeared. Particularly informative in context of 
clarifying the mood versus cognition controversy is Kuiper, Oiinger, MacDonald, and 
Shaw's (1985) research which failed to find mood-congruency effects in depressed 
persons who lacked a depressive cognitive style. A potential explanation argues that 
negative affect alone does not lead to a congruence between mood and memory.
Negative cognition associated with the self must be additionally present. Self-referencing 
should not be an important factor in mood-congruency effects if subjective mood is the 
only necessary factor. The results of Brown and Taylor’s (1986) study, however, suggest 
the opposite. Accordingly, the evidence which highlights the importance of self- 
referencing in mood and memory results is a constraint for the mood-based perspective 
and its emphasis on the role of subjective mood.
The cognitive priming perspective accounts for the role of self-referencing 
information by assuming that if the typical experimental mood-induction is self- 
referential, then cognitive priming of self-referent schemas occurs and there is a greater 
depth in processing of the information. This increased semantic involvement leads to 
increase in recall of schema-congruent self-referential information. This perspective also 
posits that mood inductions that are not self-referent will have much less impact on 
memory about the self. Consequently, schema-congruent retrieval would not be expected 
for self-memories (Riskind, 1989). This advances Blaney’s (1986) earlier proposal that 
mood-congruence effects are impossible or difficult to obtain when stimulus exposure 
occurs under mood inductions that are non-self-referencing.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The Velten MIP, which was used or adapted in two of the body image studies 
reviewed (Baker et al., 1995; Taylor & Cooper, 1992) has been criticized in studies of 
mood and memory by cognitive theorists (Blaney, 1986; Brown & Mankowski, 1993; 
Brown & Taylor, 1986; Rholes, Riskind, & Lane, 1987). This criticism supports the 
cognitive priming perspective by arguing that the Velten’s focus on self-referent 
statements influences more than just mood. The substantial cognitive aspects of the 
Velten (Martin, 1990) are often ignored and instead subjective mood becomes the focus. 
This criticism is important in light of the fact that the Velten procedure has been reported 
to be the most widely used method of experimentally inducing mood (Martin, 1990; 
Westermann, Spies, Stahl, & Hesse, 1996). Cognitive theorists reiterate that the direct 
priming of valanced cognition, rather than mood itself, influences people's self-appraisals 
(Blaney, 1986; Brown & Taylor, 1986; Rholes, Riskind, & Lane, 1987) such as body 
image. Velten’s MIP acts as a priming mechanism that activates the negative self­
schemas discussed in Beck’s (1967; Beck et al., 1976) cognitive theory. This theory 
purports that negative self-referent cognition precipitates symptoms of depression rather 
than being mere symptoms themselves. Perhaps the results of the three body image 
studies reviewed (Baker, Williamson, & Sylve, 1995; Plies & Florin, 1992; Taylor & 
Cooper, 1992) are caused by the negative thoughts induced about the self by the MIPs, 
which prime negative themes associated with the self and subsequently guide self- 
evaluations. The three experiments reviewed, however, make no reference to the 
potential influence that cognition may have had on their results. Although Plies and 
Florin (1992) did not use the Velten MIP, their mood induction required participants to 
recall negatively toned emotional experiences from their past. This procedure could have 
easily primed negative self-schema.
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Perhaps due to the recency of using MIPs to study the connection between 
affect and body image disturbances, these preliminary investigations are necessary to 
empirically document the observed association between mood and body image concerns. 
Conclusions of specific causal effects, however, can not be made until the roles of 
cognition and subjective mood have been clarified. A focus on cognition as a possible 
mediator between mood and body image evaluation would take into consideration the 
criticisms levied against the Velten MIP and other self-referent MIPs.
A theoretical question arises from these criticisms and consideration of the 
opposing positions of the mood-based and cognitive priming theoretical perspectives. Do 
moods that arise from experiences that do not directly prime the self have a direct and 
significant impact on self-evaluations? Heatherton (1998) suggests the following.
Mood states that do not hold implications about the self 
should not affect self-image,... non-self-referent (MIPs) 
may affect our moods, but they should not change the 
way we view ourselves, (p. 302.)
Heatherton et al. (1998) also investigated the issue of self-referent versus non-self 
referent mood inductions in a series of studies examining self-restraint in dieters and non­
dieters. Dietary restraint is a behavioural correlate of body image dysfunction. Herman, 
Polivy, and Heatherton (1993) state that self-regulatory failure in relation to distressing 
experiences occurs only if they have negative or unflattering implications for the self. To 
focus on the issue of self-reference, Heatherton et al. (1998) adapted Wenalaff s (1988) 
MIP to produce a MIP that could be other directed and as such was not self-referent in
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nature. Wenzlaff s imaginai procedure requires participants to visualize an individual 
in either a neutral or very negatively charged story. In the self-referent condition the 
participant is the individual in the story, whereas in the non-self-referent condition the 
individual is a member of the opposite sex to the participant. The non-self-referent 
method is hypothesized to induce negative affect via an external focus, which avoids 
reference to the self.
Using this adapted procedure. Heatherton et al. (1998) reported that the two MIPs 
were effective in increasing negative affect and had similar effect sizes for mood change. 
Furthermore, disinhibited eating was higher in the negative story condition compared to 
the neutral condition but this occurred only for participants in the self-referent condition. 
Participants in the non-self-referent neutral and negative conditions reported no 
differences in food intake. Heatherton et al. concluded that emotional distress that is not 
self-referent does not appear to disinhibit the restraints of chronic dieters. The 
maintenance of dietary restraints suggests that the negative mood induced by the non- 
self-referent MIP did not prime negative implications of the self. Heatherton et al.'s 
(1998) study highlights the differential effects of self-referent versus non-self-referent 
MIPs on self-evaluations. Their research methodology was adapted in the present study 
to investigate the potential differential influences of self-referent and non self-referent 
MIPs for body image attitudinal and perceptual self-evalutations.
Due to the clinical utility of investigating factors related to depression, most past 
research has focused on the impact of negative MIPs. What are the implications for self- 
evaluations of a positive MIP that is self-referent? Wood, Saltzbei^ and Goldsamt 
(1990) have argued that inducing positive mood does not increase self-fpcussed attention. 
They suggest that since peoples’ baseline state (i.e., neutral) is generally more positive
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negative self-schema that subsequently influence self-evaluations. Based on this 
model, only the negative self-referent MIP should lead to more derogatory self- 
evaluations. The positive self-focused MIP would not influence self-evaluations because 
positive mood does not increase self focus (Wood, Saltzberg, & Goldsamt, 1990). 
Furthermore, the other-focused MIPs should hold little implication for the self and, 
therefore, should not prime self-schema or influence self-evaluations. Specific expected 
results for the separate domains of body image self-evaluations were addressed. The three 
experimental studies reviewed (Baker et al., 1995; Plies & Florin, 1992; and Taylor & 
Cooper, 1992) focused largely on perceptual bouy image. Cash and Szymanski(1995) 
propose that body image involves two relatively distinct modalities of psychological 
importance; a perceptual dimension (body size estimation) and an attitudinal dimension.
Perceptual domain. The current study replicates past body image research 
through its investigation of the effects of self-referent MIPs on perceptual measures. The 
inclusion of a non self-referent MIP extends past research through examination of the 
role of cognition. Consistent trends have emerged in the literature which suggest that 
estimates of actual body size increase under a negative self-referent condition. 
Participants ratings of their ideal body size under negative self-referent conditions have 
varied, however, with some studies indicating stability (Baker et al., 1995), while others 
have documented a significant decrease (Taylor & Cooper, 1992). The principal 
hypothesis of the current study predicted that only the negative self-referent condition 
would influence perceptual estimates, leading to an increase in participants’ actual 
estimates and a decrease in their ideal estimates.
Attitudinal domain. The current study extends past body image research through 
the exploration of MIP effects on the attitudinal domain. This domain has been
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
18
subdivided into three components of body image: evaluation, affect, and investment 
(Brown, Cash, & MikuUca, 1990; Cash, 1994; Muth & Cash, 1997). The evaluation 
component refers to satisfaction-dissatisfaction with one’s physical attributes, as well as 
evaluative thoughts and beliefs about their appearance. These evaluations largely 
originate from self-perceived discrepancies between actual self-evaluations and 
internalised physical ideals. The affect component is related to the evaluative component 
but focuses on discrete emotional experiences that these self-evaluations may elicit in 
specific situational contexts. The cognitive-behavioural investment component 
encompasses the schematic salience, or centrality of one's appearance with regard to one's 
schema of self-evaluation, and the behaviours involving the management or enhancement 
of appearance (Cash & Jacobi, 1992, Cash & Labarge, 1996). Past research has not 
adequately addressed the influence of MIPs on these attitudinal dimension and, therefore, 
any predictions are based largely on theory. The current study’s principal hypothesis 
predicts that only the negative self-referent MIP would influence attitudinal measures 
causing them to increase.
Self-Esteem. The inclusion of self-esteem represented a secondary investigation 
of the current study to determine if any differential effects from the MIPs would occur in 
domains other than body image. Heatherton et al. (1998), examined the issue of self­
relevance for effects of MIPs on self-esteem. Participants exposed to either task failure 
or a sad music MIP both reported lower self-esteem scores. The musical MIP was chosen 
to represent a non self-referent method, however, the researchers argued that music 
indirectly primes the self due to its ambiguous nature. A follow-up study found no 
change in self-esteem when participants were told that the music MIP would influence 
their mood. A final study failed to find self-esteem effects for either self-referent or non
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self-referent Imaginai MIPs. Heatherton et al. (1998) argued that the nature of the 
imagery (killing someone in a car accident) was not a suitable method for influencing 
self-esteem. The current study predicted that only the negative self-referent MIP would 
influence participants’ self-esteem ratings leading to more derogatory self-appraisals.
Method
Participants
Eighty female undergraduate students from Lakehead University, who were 
recruited from a larger study involving 262 students, took part in the post-Mood 
Induction Procedure phase of the current study. Ages ranged from 18-51 with a mean 
age of 21.6. Participants signed a consent form before exposure to the experimental 
manipulation (see Appendix A).
Design
The study consisted o f a mixed within and between subject design with four 
conditions. The within-subject variable was time (pre- vs. post-MIP) and the between- 
subject variables were method of mood induction (self vs. other) and mood valence 
(positive vs. negative). All participants took part in the study twice and completed a set 
of measures before (pre-MIP) and after (post-MIP). The time interval between the 
conditions ranged from 7 - 1 4  days.
Measuies
Participants completed three profile characteristic measures listed first below at 
pre-MIP only. Participants also completed the remaining seven dependent variable 
measures listed below before and after the experimental mampulation.
Beck Depression Inventory. The BDI (see Appendix B) was used to assess 
symptoms of depression. Participants who scored above 22 on this measure were
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excluded from completing the post-MIP phase for ethical reasons. The BDI has well 
established internal consistency, Cronbach’s alpha r.=.84, and good test-retest 
reliabilities (.60-.83). Concurrent and construct validity of the BDI with other 
measures of depression are also reported (Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 1988).
Bodv Shape Questionnaire. Form B, one of the two shortened, alternate forms of 
the BSQ was used (see Appendix C). This questionnaire is a 16-item self-report measure 
of negative feelings about body size and shape (Cooper et al., 1987). High scores 
represent more negative feelings about body size and shape. The shortened BSQ forms 
have good internal consistency with alpha values in the range of .93 to .96. The 
shortened versions also display good validity and show significant correlations with the 
Eating Attitudes Test (.58 to .63), and depression scores (.41-.53).
Bodv Mass Index. [BMI; weight in kg/(height in m) ]̂
Depressive Adjectives Checklist The DACL was chosen to assess change in 
mood related to the experimental manipulations. Participants were asked to fill out Form 
A (see Appendix D) of this assessment just prior to the experimental manipulation and 
then to fill out the alternate Form B (see Appendix E) directly after the experimental 
manipulation. This measure has previously been used to assess the effects of MIPs 
(Martin, 1990). This measure has good reliability (Lubin & Himmelstein, 1976) and 
concurrent validity (Lubin, 1967).
Visual Analogue scales. Participants were asked to rate the adjectives sad and 
happy for how closely they resembled their feelings at that precise moment in time on a 
scale from "not at all’ (0 mm) to extreme’ (100 mm). The validity of visual analogue 
mood scales for assessing mood change has been established in previous studies (Folstein 
& Luria, 1973, Martin, 1990). Participants were also asked to rate their degree of
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weight/size dissatisfaction on a scale that was anchored with ’None’ (0 mm) to 
’Extreme’ (100 mm). This method of assessing body image dissatisfaction had been 
shown to be valid (Gamer, Olmstead, & Polivy, 1983). The interpretation of these items 
was left up to the participants themselves.
Bodv-Image Ideals Questionnaire. Cash and Szymanski’s (1995) development of 
the Body-Image Ideals Questionnaire (BIQ) (see Appendix F), provides a useful 
framework for studying potential MIP influences on body image. The BIQ incorporates 
the evaluative and investment attitudinal components of body image by measuring self­
perceived discrepancies from, and importance of, internalized ideals for multiple physical 
characteristics. The BIQ is composed of two relatively distinct and internally consistent 
Discrepancy and Importance subscales, as well as their multiplicative composite.
The scope of much body image research is limited by the predominant focus on 
weight concerns. Other physical attributes, such as facial characteristics, height, muscle 
tone and body shape, contribute significantly to global body image attitudes but are 
largely ignored(Cash, 1989; 1990). The BIQ attempts to overcome this limitation by 
creating a composite body image satisfaction score based on multiple physical attributes 
that contribute to body image concerns. Ratings on this measure give a more global 
estimate of body image satisfaction, and determine the importance of the individual 
factors through assessment of the importance of each. A limitation for this newly 
developed measure is the lack of information concerning its test-retest reliability.
Concerns for Shape and Weight. The CSAW (Davis & Phillips, 1996) (see 
Appendix G) is a 40-item scale which measures a variety of personal opinions and 
feelings an individual holds towards their own body weight and shape. The CSAW is 
composed of two subscales; attitude and affect. The 22-item Attitudinal subscale reflects
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composed of two subscales; attitude and affect. The 22-item Attitudinal subscale 
reflects the extent to which respondents idealize and value thinness with respect to their 
overall scheme of self-evaluation. The 18-item Affective subscale reflects the extent to 
which respondents project negative affect onto their own body image. The Attitudinal 
subscale includes 22 items and reflects the extent to which respondents hold negative 
attitudes towards their own body image. Items are evaluated on a five-point Likert scale 
ranging from “strongly disagree” through “strongly agree”.
Two-week test-retest reliabilities for the instrument are high; r =.94 and r = .85, 
for the Affective and Attitudinal subscales respectively. Internal consistecy is high. 
Cronbach’s alphas for the Affective and Attitudinal subscales are .94 and .98 
respectively. The subscales are highly intercorrelated, r = .73. Regarding concurrent 
validity, the Affective subscale correlates r = .84, and r = .70, with the widely used Eating 
Disorder Inventory (EDI-2; Gamer, 1991) Body Dissatisfaction subscale and Drive for 
Thinness subscale. The Attitudinal subscale correlates r_= 66, and r = .70, with these two 
EDI-2 subscales. Thus, the CSAW appears to be both a reliable and valid measure of the 
attitudinal and affective components of body image.
Bodv Image Assessment Scale. The BIAS (Gardner, Stark, Jackson, & Friedman, 
1998) (see Appendix H) is conceptually similar to Stunkard, Someson, and Schlusinger’s 
(1983) well-documented body size estimate measure. The BIAS requires participants to 
place a vertical mark at a point between two distorted figures (one very thin, the other 
very wide), placed 12.5 inches apart on legal sized paper, for their actual body size and 
their ideal body size. A contiguous line, with an intersection in the centre to indicate the 
average female (137.8 lb., 63.7 inches) connects the two figures. The scale was created 
by distorting the width of the median American female by +/- 30%. A separate scale is
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perceived body size was calculated by the degree of correspondence between the 
individual’s perceived and reported weight, c (81) = .68, and Body Mass Index, i  (81) = 
.74. Three week test-retest reliability was high, r = .89.
State Self-Esteem Scale This 20-item index (SSES; see Appendix I) assesses 
momentary fluctuations in self-esteem (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). Three subscales; 
performance, appearance, and social, investigate specific areas of self-esteem. Internal 
consistency is high (coefficient alpha = .92) and has been shown to measure temporary 
changes in self-evaluation. Psychometric studies have shown the SSES to be separable 
from mood (Bagozzi & Heatherton, 1994).
Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale The RSE (Rosenberg, 1965 ) (see Appendix J) is a 
well-validated measure of global self-worth. Ten items are answered on 4 point scales 
that range from “0”, strongly disagree, to “3” strongly agree. This measure has test-retest 
reliability of .85 (Thompson & Heinberg, 1993).
Experimental Manipulation
Participants at the pre-MIP assessment period were recruited by the experimenter 
to partake in a supposedly separate study related to factors influencing peoples’ 
perceptions. When participants returned to the laboratory they were randomly assigned 
to one of the four experimental conditions. Participants in all conditions were seated in a 
comfortable chair in a small room with soft lighting. Afrer filling out the DACL, form A, 
participants were told to listen to a tape, played on a Sony TCM -  737 cassette recorder, 
which had the appropriate MIP instructions. Immediately following the MIP, participants 
filled out the DACL, form B, followed by the package of questionnaires they had filled 
out at the pre-MIP test phase.
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Self-referent MIPs: positive-self and negative-self. A verbal self-referencing 
procedure developed by Seibert and Ellis (1991) was used to induce positive and negative 
affect (Appendix K and L detail these procedures respectively). This method was 
assessed with the DACL (Lubin, 1967), and was shown to be a valid and effective means 
o f inducing happy and sad mood states. Self-referent mood statements have also been 
experimentally shown to be potent manipulators of mood as assessed by visual analogue 
scales (Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979). This procedure follows from Velten's (1968) well 
researched MIP but modernises the language for typical college undergraduates. There 
are no references to somatic states which allows the focus to remain on self-conceptions. 
These procedures required the participants to read aloud 25 statements at 20 second 
intervals. Participants were instructed not to resist the mood influences of the statements 
but attempt to experience them fully. Participant instructions for the self-referent MIPs 
are listed in Appendix M.
Non-self-referent MIP. The non-self-referent mood induction was based on an Imaginai 
mood induction procedure developed by Sedikides (1995). This procedure involved an 
other-directed, outward attentional focus. This other-directed focus required participants 
to think about another person as the target of an event. Outward attentional focus refers 
to thinking about another person’s thoughts and feelings (Carlson & Miller, 1987). 
Sedikides (1992) states that the other-directed, outward attentional focus procedure was 
used to avoid increasing attentional focus on the self. As such, the present author 
suggests that this MIP approach avoided, or at the least minimised, cognitive priming of 
the self-schema. Instructions for the non self-referent MIPs are listed in Appendix N.
Positive-other. Participants were induced into a positive mood state by first 
imagining for 2 minutes that a friend of theirs had won a free trip to Hawaii. Participants
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were given scenic pictures to aid them in their imagery. They then spent 3 minutes 
writing about the friend's feelings and thoughts when on the vacation in Hawaii. 
Participants were then asked to imagine for 2 minutes that their friend had also won $1 
million in the provincial lottery. Participants wrote about their friend’s feelings and 
thoughts for an additional 3 minutes.
Negative-other. Participants were induced into a sad mood state by first 
imagining that a friend of theirs was burned in a fire and was in critical condition. They 
then imagined for 2 minutes how their friend would feel and think and were provided 
with photographs of bum victims to assist them in their imagination. Participants then 
spent 3 minutes writing about their friend’s feelings and thoughts. Next, participants 
imagined for 2 minutes that their friend succumbed to the injuries and died. Participants 
were shown a picture of a funeral scene. Finally, participants wrote for 3 minutes about 
the feelings and thoughts that the friend's parents would experience at the funeral.
Results
Analytic strategy.
The participants’ profile characteristics were analyzed using analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). Separate multivariate analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs) were conducted 
for each of the four dependent variable domains at post-MIP with method (self vs. other) 
and mood (positive vs. negative) representing between-subject variables. To focus on 
change in participants’ ratings associated with the MIPs, pre-MIP dependent variable 
ratings were treated as covariates. The goal of this analytic strategy was to test the null 
hypothesis that all four experimental groups have the same dependent variable means at 
post- MIP after adjusting for preexisting differences. Contributions of the individual 
dependent variables to a significant MANCOVA were evaluated through follow-up
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ANCOVAs. The inflated Type I error rate associated with conducting multiple 
univariate F tests was controlled for through the use of Holm’s modified Bonferroni 
(Howell, 1997). Change from pre- to post-MIP for the dependent variables was also 
examined to assist in interpretation of significant differences.
Participant characteristics.
Table I lists the internal reliability of all dependent variable measures. The pre- 
MIP profile characteristics for all participants are shown in Table 2. Participants were 
comparable across all profile variables as no significant differences were found between 
the MIP experimental groups. Table 3 lists descriptive statistics for dependent variables 
at both pre-MIP and post-MIP. Preliminary analyses indicated that there were no 
significant group differences on these variables at pre-MIP. Table 4 lists the 
intercorrelations between profile and dependent variables at both pre- and post-MIP.
Table 4 lists the internal reliability of all dependent variable measures.
Effect of Experimental Manipulation 
Manipulation Check: Affect Domain
A 2 X 2 between-subjects MANCOVA was performed on three dependent 
variables associated with change in affect; VAS sad, VAS happy, and DACL. With the 
use of Wilk s criterion, the affect variables were significantly influenced by both method, 
F(3,71) = 5.45, g = .002, and mood, F(3,71)= 15.62, g < .001, as well as their 
interaction, F(3,71) = 3.14, g = .031. To investigate the impact of each dependent 
variable on the main effects and their interaction, univariate F tests were performed. 
Results of these analyses are summarized in Table 5. Holm’s modified Bonferroni
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Table 1
Internal Reliabilities of Dependent Variable Measures
Measure M §D Cronbach’s <x
CSAW Attitude subscale 31.2 (15.3) .93
CSAW Affect subscale 34.6 (18.0) .98
BIQ Importance subscale 17.3 (6.3) .85
BIQ Discrepancy subscale 12.2 (5.1) .80
Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale 31.9 (4.9) .88
State Self-Esteem Scale 72.7 (13.3) .93
Note. CSAW = Concern for Shape and Weight; BIQ = Body Image 
Ideals Questionnaire.
N = 260 female participants from overall testing pool at Pre-Mood 
Induction Procedure.
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics of Participant Profiles at Pre-Mood Induction Procedure (MlPl
Note. No significant differences between MIP conditions were found.
Positive-self Negative-self Positive-other Negative-other
Profile measure M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) E
Age 19.5 (.6) 21.4 (8.3) 23.0 (6.9) 22.0 (7.0) 0.75
Body mass index 25.2 (3.7) 24.0 (44) 24.1 (3.3) 24.5 (5.0) 0.80
Beck Depression Inventory 9.3 (6.1) 7.8 (5.2) 7.2 (5.1) 6.7 (5.2) 0.84






























Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables at Pre- and Post-Mood Induction Procedure (MIP).
Positive-self   Negative-self______  ______Positive-other   Negative-other
ON Pre-MIP Post-MIP Pre-MIP Post-MIP Pre-MIP POst-MIP Pre-MIP POst-MIP(N Dependent variable M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M o
Body image attitudinal variables i
CD
Q .
CSAW Aflect 35.7 (18.0) 31.9 (16.3) 38.6 (19.1) 43.0 (21.3) 27.7 (19.6) 29.5 (19.7) 33.5 (14.8) 30.1 (15.1) " 5
O
CSAW Attitude 30.3 (15.9) 28.9 (16.1) 35.1 (17.6) 38.8 (17.9) 27.8 (17.9) 29.9 (17.8) 30.2 (15 1) 30.3 (10.7)
"O
BIQ Importance 16.4 (7.1) 14.7 (7.0) 19.1 (6.0) 20.0 (5.1) 16.8 (5.3) 15.8 (6.7) 18.0 (5.2) 16.1 (4.7)
CD








Body image perceptual variables 2Q.
2
BIAS Actual 126.6 (52.0) 121.2 (38.6) 125.4 (50.3) 132.2 (49.4) 126.0 (55.4) 127.0 (46.0) 132.3 (32.2) 130.4 (30.3)








VAS happy 59.7 (22.5) 63.4 (20.3) 70.2 (19.8) 46.1 (24.3) 67.3 (19.5) 64.5 (25.6) 69.8 (16.8) 20.6 (21.6) >\Q.
8





Rosenberg Self-Esteem 32.1 (4.7) 32.0 (5.0) 31.3 (5.2) 30.5 (5.3) 34.1 (4.3) 34.5 (4.8) 32.0 (6.7) 32.2 (7.0)
'( / )
i
State Self-Esteem Scale 72.6 (12.2) 74.3 (14.7) 72.8 (13.3) 70.7 (12.7) 77.0 (13.2) 76.9 (14.5) 73.6 (9.6) 74.3 (11.8)
CD
Q.
Note. CSAW = Concern for Shape and Weight; BIQ = Body Image Questionnaire. VAS = risual analogue scale; BIAS = Body Image Assessment Scale; DACL
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Intercoirelations Among Profile and Dependent Variables Pre- and Post-Mood Induction Procedure (/)(/>
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 12 13 14 15 16
Profile variables
1 Age 28' -10 02 -02 ■07 -10 19 ■03 14 16 10 -13 07 30 05
2. Body Mass index — 03 29* 22 05 -08 23' 25' 59* 34* 09 -09 ■03 ■05 -14
3. Beck Depression Inventory — 56* 44* 42* 32* 25' 40* 20 -14 31* -13 25' -39* -42*
4. Body Shape Questionnaire — 86* 78* 39* 60* 71* 55* -18 33* -34* 29* -58* -70*
Body image attitudinal variables
5. CSAW Aflfect - 82* 46* 68* 84* 56* -13 31* -38* 40* -64* -78*
6. CSAW Attitude 82* — 55* 60* 73* 39* -28' 31* -31* 38* -64* -73*
7. BIQ Importance 35* 53* — 41* 42* 17 -10 14 -13 20 -32* -33*
8. BIQ Discrepancy 45* 46* 24* — 56* 58* -01 22 -28' 31* ■46* -56*



































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 12 13 14 15 16
Body image perceptual variables
10. BIAS Actual 65* 47* 12 47* 57* — 41* 26' -28' 24' -27' -41*
II. BIAS Ideal -02 -25' -19 02 -10 45* - -02 -06 •04 21 12
Affect variables
12. VAS sad 07 13 -06 03 03 -05 -08 — -64* 78* -29' -40*
13. VAS happy -24' -18 04 -18 -17 •01 06 30 — -71* 34 41*
14. DACL 48* 49* 14 23' 37* 23' -10 26' -21 — -39* -49*
Self-Esteem variables
IS. Rosenberg Self-Esteem -55* -59* -31* 39* -39* -39* -05 -21 06 -31* - 73*
16. State Self-Esteem Scale -75* -73* -33* -54* -61* -48* 06 -19 30* -$7* 63* -
Note. Decimals have been omitted from Pearson product moment correlations. Pre-MIP correlations appear in the lower triangle; 
Post-MIP correlations in the upper triangle. CSAW = Concern for Shape and Weight; BIQ = Body Image Questionnaire; VAS = 
visual analogue scale; BIAS = Body Image Assessment Scale; DACL = Depressive Adjective Checklist.






























correction of alpha is shown in the last column of Table S for each of the dependent 
variables.
The significant main effects of method and mood on the DACL (see Table S) 
were due to participants in the negative conditions reporting more negative affect than 
those in the positive conditions, and participants in the other-referent conditions reporting 
more negative affect than those in the self-referent condition. A significant Method x 
Mood interaction was found for VAS sad and VAS happy affect variables (see Table S). 
To determine the source of this interaction, post hoc tests contrasted the negative-self M 
with the negative-other M at post-MIP, with pre-MIP means covaried out. Bonferroni 
corrected alpha was set at .025 for each test. Participants in the negative-other condition 
reported significantly higher VAS sad scores, F(l, 37) =13.2, jy= .001, as well as 
significantly lower VAS happy scores, F(l,37) =13.01, g=.001, compared to the negative- 
self condition. Change in affect variables from pre to post-MIP was also examined, (see 
Table 6) No significant change was detected in either of the two positive mood 
conditions. Both negative mood conditions showed significant change on all three affect 
variables.
To summarize, it was predicted that a significant mood effect would result from 
the MIPs. This effect did emerge and was largely related to significant change in affect 
for participants in the negative conditions. An unexpected finding, however, was that the 
effects of the negative conditions were not of equal magnitude. Participants in the 
negative-other condition reported significantly greater levels of sadness and lower levels 
o f happiness than participants in the negative-self condition.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table S
Analysis of Covariance for Method. Mood, and their Interaction for Affect
Source
Dependent
Variable Univariate F df B , a
Method VAS sad 10.57 1/76 .002 .017
VAS happy 6.84 1/75 01 r .025
DACL 5.00 1/75 .028* .05
Mood VAS sad 19.85 1/76 <001* .017
VAS happy 40.39 1/75 <001* .025
DACL 26.30 1/75 <001* .05
Method by 
mood
VAS sad 7.56 1/76 .007* .017
interaction VAS happy 5.76 1/75 .019* .025



















Note. VAS = visual analogue scale; DACL = Depressive Adjectives Checklist, 










^  Table 6
Change in Affect. Pre- to Post-MIP
Dependent Positive-self Negative-self Positive-other Negative-other
Variable t df p t df p t df p t df p
VAS sad 2.07 19 .052 -3.15 19 .005 - 13 19 .896 -3.69 19 .002
VAS happy -0.56 19 .584 4.84 19 <001 .48 19 .641 8.18 19 <001
DACL 1.69 19 .108 -3.78 19 .001 -1.98 19 .062 -5.90 19 <001
Note. VAS = visual analogue scale; DACL = Depressive Adjective Checklist. Negative t values indicate 































Bodv Image Attitudinal Domain
A 2 X 2 between-subjects MANCOVA was performed on five attitudinal 
dependent variables; CSAW affect, CSAW attitude, BIQ discrepancy, BIQ importance, 
and VAS weight/size dissatisfaction. With the use of Wilk’s criterion, the attitudinal 
variables were not significantly affected by either method, F(5,67) = 1.42, p = .230, or 
mood, F(5,67) = 0.73, p = .605. A significant Method x Mood interaction was found, 
F(5,67) = 4.74, p = .001.
Follow-up tests were performed through ANCOVA to examine the contribution 
of the individual variables to this interaction. To test the principle hypothesis that only 
the negative-self condition would influence participants’ body image ratings, a priori 
comparisons were performed. These analyses compared the negative-self M to the 
pooled M of the other three conditions at post-MIP, with pre-MIP scores treated as 
covariates. Preliminary analyses suggested that this a priori comparison was an 
appropriate strategy because, except for the CSAW affect measure, there were no 
significant post-MIP differences between the Ms of the three pooled conditions. 
Consequently, the CSAW affect variable was examined separately. Results of the 
evaluative and investment dimension analyses are summarized in Table 7. Holm’s 
modified Bonferroni correction of alpha is shown in the last column of Table 7 for each 
of the dependent variables.
Evaluative and investment dimensions. Three out of the four variables showed 
significant differences with the fourth, BIQ discrepancy, approaching significance. 
Examination of the change in Ms (see Table 8) indicated that, except for the CSAW 
attitude variable, these differences were not solely associated with an increase in the 
negative-self condition but also related to a decrease in the combined Ms.
35
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^  Table 7
Analysis of Covariance for Body Image Attitudes with Pre-Mood Induction Procedure treated as the Covariate: A Priori Comparisons
Negative-self* Combined groups"
Dependent Pre-MIP Post-MIP Pre-MIP Post-MIP
variable M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) E df D a
CSAW attitude 35.1 (17.6) 38.8 (179) 30.0 (15.1) 29.7 (14.9) 6.10 1/77 .016' .025
BIQ discrepancy 13.8 (6.7) 14.1 (7.3) 12 I (5.6) 112 (4.4) 3.57 1/77 .062 .05
W/S dissatisfaction 49.1 (26.5) 57.6 (32.5) 42.5 (29.1) 38.4 (27.5) 9.80 1/77 .002* .013
BIQ importance 19.1 (6.0) 20.0 (5.1) 17.1 (5.9) 15.5 (6.1) 7.66 1/77 .007* .017












Note. Combined groups = pooled means of negative-other, positive-self, and positive-other conditions;
CSAW = Concern for Shape and Weight; BIQ = Body Image Questionnaire; W/S = Weight and Size.













Change in Evaluative and Investment Bodv Image Attitudes. Pre- 
to Post-Mood Induction ProcedurelMIP): A Priori Comparison
variable t i f P Î df D
CSAW attitude 0.41 59 .685 -1.90 19 .072
BIQ discrepancy 1.38 59 .173 -0.52 19 .607
BIQ importance 2.48 59 .016 -1.13 19 .272
VAS w/s dissatisfaction 1.82 59 .074 -2.10 19 .050
Note. Combined Groups = pooled Ms of the negative-other, 
positive-other, and positive-self conditions. CSAW = Concern for 
Shape and Weight; BIQ = Body-Image Ideals Questionnaire; VAS 
w/s = visual analogue scale for weight and size. Negative |  values 
indicate an increase in scores from pre- to post-MIP. Positive t 
values indicate a decrease in scores from pre- to post-MIP.
I
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Affect dimension. A 2 x 2 between-subjects ANCOVA was performed on the 
CSAW affect measure. Similar to the MANCOVA, no main effects for either method,
F(l, 75)= .839, £.=.363, or mood, F(l, 75)= 1.42, £.= .237 were found. A significant 
Method X Mood interaction was found, F(l, 75)= 20.25, £.< .001. To determine the 
source of this interaction, five post hoc tests were performed which sets Bonferroni 
corrected alpha set at .01. Figure 1 shows change in the CSAW affect scores pre- to post- 
MIP. The source of this interaction was due to the predicted significant increase in the 
negative-self condition, t(19) = -2.97, g = .004, as well as an unexpected significant 
decrease in the negative-other condition, t(19) =2.91, .009. Contrasts of the negative-
self M to the negative-other M, with pre-MIP Ms covaried out, indicate that the negative- 
self M was significantly higher, F(l, 37) = 15.7, £< .001. A decrease in CSAW affect 
scores was also observed for the positive-self condition, which was significant at the 
conventional alpha level of .05, t(19) =2.12, g = 048, but not significant when alpha level 
was corrected.
To summarize the results thus far, the MIPs had a larger influence on affect 
attitudinal ratings compared to the evaluative and investment attitude ratings. This larger 
influence was expressed through significant change for the CSAW affect scores from pre- 
to post-MIP, whereas, only non-significant trends emerged pre- to post-MIP for the 
evaluative and investment dimensions. All three dimensions, however, showed 
significantly different change between groups. These differences were not solely related 
to an increase in the negative-self condition as predicted, but also associated with 
decreases in the other three groups.
r
I















Figure 1 Change in CSAW affect from Pre- to Post-MIP. Higher scores indicate more negative body image evaluations. n= 
20 for each condition. Neg-S = negative-self; Pos-S = positive-self; Neg-O = negative-other; Pos-O = positive-other. Points 
represent the mean CSAW scores; vertical lines depict standard errors of the means.
























Perceptual Body Image Domain
A 2 X 2 between-subjects MANCOVA was performed on the two perceptual body 
image variables; BIAS actual, and BIAS ideal. With the use of Wilk’s criterion, the 
perceptual variables were not significantly affected by method, E(2, 73) = 0.09, p = .919, 
or mood, £(2, 73) = 2.16, p = . 122, or their interaction, £(2, 73) = 1.32, p = .272.
To more closely replicate Taylor and Cooper’s (1992) study, which found 
significant mood effects on perceptual measures, a sensitivity analysis was performed. 
The total sample was divided into two subgroups; those scoring equal to or above the 
Mdn on the BSQ and those scoring below. Separate MANCOVAs were then performed 
on these two subgroups. Using Wilks’ criterion, for the high BSQ subgroup a significant 
difference was found for mood, £(2,34) = 6.49, p = .004, but no difference was found for 
method, £(2,24) = .87, p = .430. A significant Mood x Method interaction was also 
found, £(2,34) = 5.2, p = .011. These differences were not found in the low BSQ 
subgroup.
Table 9 lists descriptive statistics for the low and high BSQ groups. To determine 
the source of the significant mood effect and Mood x Method interaction for the high 
BSQ groups, follow-up 2 x 2  between-subjects ANCOVAs were performed. This 
analytic strategy was used in lieu of the a priori comparison, which contrasted the 
negative-self M with the combined groups M, because of the significant mood effect.
The BIAS actual variable showed a significant Method x Mood interaction, £(1,36) = 
7.41, p = .01 (Holm’s modified Bonferroni = .025), but no significant mood effect, £(1, 
36) = 2.18, p = .149. The opposite results were found for the BIAS ideal variable with a 
significant mood effect, £(1,36) = 10.58, p = .002, but no interaction effect, £(1,36) = 
0.03, p = .863. Change in perceptual variables for high and low BSQ subgroups is shown
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5  Table 9
Descriptive Statistics for Perceptual Body Image at Pre- and Post-Mood Induction Procedure (MIP): Sensitivity Analysis
Positive-self Negative-self Positive-other Negative-other
High BSQ group* 
BIAS Actual* 158.4 (35.6) 138.3 (33.7) 142.0 (47.0) 150.9 (43.1) 160.4 (57.0) 157.3 (37.2) 137.2 (34.5) 132.5 (36.0)
BIAS Ideal" 80.2 (32.0) 72.5 (32.0) 76.5 (43.1) 91.4 (39.3) 76.3 (41.6) 61.5 (33.1) 60.9 (34.0) 72.2 (35.3)
Low BSQ group'’ 
BIAS Actual 94.7 (46.7) 104.1 (36.9) 94.6 (43.4) 97.4 (43.1) 103.1 (42.5) 106.7 (40.7) 127.3 (30.8) 128.3 (25.1)
BIAS Ideal 81.2 (38.7) 89.8 (33.3) 53.6 (35.8) 68.3 (45.8) 83.3 (34.7) 91.5 (22.4) 101.4 (19.3) 105.0 (25.0)
(/)(/>
Pre MIP Post-MIP Pre-MIP Post-MIP Pre-MIP Post-MIP Pre MIP Post-MIP ^
Note. BSQ = Body Shape Questionnaire; BIAS = Body Image Assessment Scale
*n = 10 for Positive-self, Ï3 for Negative-self, 8 for Positive-other, 10 for Negative-other. **n = 10 for Positive-self, 7 for Negative- 
other, 12 for Positive-other, and 10 for Negative-other.
Significant Method x Mood interaction (p = .01).



























9  Table 10
Change in Perceptual Body Image. Pre- tO Post-Mood Induction Procedure (MIPL Sensitivity Analysis
Dependent Positive-self Negative-self Positive-other Negative-other




BIAS Actual 0.81 19 .429 -1.86 19 .078 -0.20 19 .846 0.51 19 619 
ĈD









BIAS Actual 2.49 9 .035 -1.78 12 .098 0.34 7 748 0.99 9 350
BIAS Ideal .91 9 .389 -2.07 12 .060 1.70 7 134 -2.62 9 .028
Low BSQ Group ^
CD
C
BIAS Actual -I II 9 .294 -.57 6 .588 -0.77 II .456 -.18 9 .864 i
£
BIAS Ideal -1.38 9 .202 -1.55 6 .173 -0 99 II .343 -.45 9 .662 |
8
CDg
Note. BIAS = Body Image Assessment Scale; BSQ = Body Shape Questionnaire. Negative t values o









in Table 10. The interaction for the BIAS actual variable was associated with a 
I  decrease in the positive-self and negative-other Ms and an increase in the negative-self 
M The significant MIP effect for the BIAS ideal, however, ran counter to the principal 
hypothesis of the current study for two reasons. First, the negative-self condition actually 
increased participants’ ideal estimates, a result that contradicts past research. Second, the 
negative-other condition showed this same trend with an increase in ideal estimates.
In summary then, only the high BSQ subgroup showed significant perceptual M 
differences between the MIP conditions. The BIAS actual variable largely supported the 
current study’s principal hypothesis but the BIAS ideal variable did not offer support. 
Self-Esteem Domain
A 2 X 2 between-subjects MANCOVA was performed on the two dependent 
variables associated with change in self-esteem variables; RSE and SSES. With the use 
of Wilk’s criterion, the self-esteem variables were not significantly affected by either 
method, E(2, 73) = 0.75, p = .478, or mood,_E(2,73) = 0.64, p = .530, nor their 
interaction, £(2,73) = 0.49, p = .618.
Past researchers have divided participants into high and low self-esteem groups 
before exposure to experimental manipulations ( Brown & Mankowski, 1993; Wood et 
al., 1990). A sensitivity analysis was performed by dividing the total sample into two 
subgroups; those scoring above the Mdn on the SSES and those scoring equal to or 
below. No self-esteem differences were found for the low self-esteem subgroup related 
to the MIPs.
Examination of the Ms of the high self-esteem subgroup suggested that the 
current study’s a priori comparison was an appropriate analytic strategy. A MANCOVA 
was performed on the SSES and RSE variables, which contrasted the negative-self
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condition to the combined groups. Although after application of Wilks’ criterion, this 
test was not statistically significant, F(2,34) = 3.08, p = .059, follow-up ANCOVAs were 
performed due to the small sample size and the large effect sizes observed for the 
negative-self condition. Table 11 lists separate ANCOVAs for both self-esteem 
measures, as well as the three subscales that sum to make the overall SSES. Participants 
reporting high initial self-esteem reported significantly lower total SSES at Post-MIP. 
This result was largely due to decreases in Appearance subscale scores for the negative- 
self condition. Performance subscale scores added to this effect.
Discussion
The present study evaluated the effect of brief exposure to either self-referent or 
non self-referent mood induction procedures on the body image concerns of women. 
Although the positive MIPs only showed a tendency to improve mood, the negative MIPs 
induced increased dysphoria. Although the negative-other condition resulted in greater 
dysphoria relative to the negative self-referent condition, increased body image concern 
was observed only when the MIP was personally relevant. The negative-other MIP was 
predicted to remain stable but this condition was associated with an unexpected overall 
trend of decreased body image concern. Body image evaluations overall, then, changed 
in opposite directions for the negative MIPs. The only influence for the MIPs on self­
esteem emerged for participants who initially reported high self-esteem. The self-esteem 
of these individuals decreased after the negative-self condition. The present study 
represents a direct test of the validity of competing theoretical positions: mood-based 
versus cognitive priming, which predicted different associations between mood and body 
image. Results largely refute the mood-based perspective and are interpreted as support 
for the cognitive priming perspective. An exception to this support was participants’
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 11
Analysis of Covariance for Self-Esteem with Pre-Mood Induction Procedure Means treated as the Covariate: 
A Priori Comparison for High State Self-Esteem Scale Group
Negative-self* Combined groups'*
Dependent Pre-MIP Post-MIP Pre-MIP Post-MIP
Rosenberg Self-Esteem 33.9 (3.2) 32.5 (4.7) 35.0 (3.5) 36.0 (5.2) 2.66 1/36 .112
State Self-Esteem Scale Total 811* (5.3) 75.8* (9.3) 84.9 (5.8) 85.0 (7.5) 6.03 1/36 .019
Performance subscale 33.8** (2.9) 32.4** (3.9) 34.6 (2.8) 34.7 (3.2) 3.20 1/36 .082
Appearance subscale 29.3"* (2.4) 25.9*" (3.5) 30.5 (2.7) 30.3 (2.8) 13.70 1/36 .001
Social subscale 18.0 (3.8) 17.5 (3.9) 19.8 (2.5) 19.9 (2.9) 1.49 1/36 231
Note. Combined groups = pooled means of negative-other, positive-self, and positive-other conditions; 
*n = 11 for negative-self, *’n = 28 for the combined groups.































ideal estimates, for they increased under both negative conditions for participants who 
initially reported high body image concern. This result can be interpreted as support for 
the mood-congruency effect. The results are discussed individually for each dependent 
variable domain, followed by a discussion of their implications for the field of 
psychology.
Attitudinal Domain
Results for the attitudinal domain argue against the mood-congruency conception 
and provide support for the cognitive priming perspective. The magnitude of effect was 
largest for the affect dimension, but the evaluative and investment dimensions also 
showed significant increases in body image concerns compared to the other conditions. 
This difference in effect size may be related to the more specific focus on shape and 
weight concerns of the affect measure used. Regardless, participants rated their body size 
to be more distressing, important, and derogatory after the negative self-referent 
condition compared to the other three conditions. The only attitudinal measure that did 
not show significant differences associated with the MIPs was the BIQ discrepancy scale, 
which was an evaluative measure. This scale had relatively weaker internal reliability 
(.80), compared to the other body image measures, which may explain this non­
significant finding.
The trend for participants to report more body image concerns after the negative 
self-referent condition can be explained by the priming of negative self-schemas that 
make negative body image evaluations more accessible. The unexpected decrease in the 
investment and affective concerns of participants who underwent the positive self­
referent MIP suggest that positive thoughts about the self can ameliorate some body 
image concerns.
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The most difficult result for the mood-congruency conception to explain was 
the significant decrease in affective body image concerns for participants in the negative 
other-referent MIP. This result, however, also runs counter to the current study’s 
hypothesis for this procedure was expected to remain stable. How did this MIP, which 
was designed to have no implications for the self, result in changes for affective body 
image self-evaluations? Social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) has been implicated 
as a potential cause of body image disturbances (Ogden & Mundray, 1996; Shaw & 
Waller, 1995; Stormer & Thompson), and it provides a plausible answer for this 
unexpected result. Shaw and Waller (1995) reported that adolescent women with the 
greatest degree of responsiveness to media images of ideal women were also those who 
had the greatest tendency to make social comparisons when appraising themselves 
overall. Stormer and Thompson’s (1996) correlational study indicated that social 
comparison, as measured by the tendency to compare one’s own weight/size to that of 
other individuals, is a significant predictor of both body dissatisfaction and eating 
disturbances. Evidence that supports the application of social comparison theory to the 
present study is by Ogden and Mundray’s (1996) investigation. These researchers 
showed that both males and females reported increased body image dissatisfaction after 
viewing pictures of thin fashion models, but less body image dissatisfaction after viewing 
pictures of overweight individuals. Participants who were exposed to images of a bum 
victim, whose body was severely damaged, in the negative non self-referent MIP may 
have engaged in an upward comparison, which lead to a subsequent decrease in their 
body image affective concerns. Social comparisons can be argued to require cognition, 
and as such, this result can be interpreted as support for the cognitive priming 
perspective.
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Perceptual Domain
The significant results of the two perceptual body image variables, for participants 
who initially reported body image concerns, appear to provide mixed support for the 
current study’s hypothesis. Participants’ estimates of actual body size support the 
cognitive priming perspective. However, a mood-congruency effect appears to have 
emerged for participants’ ideal estimates. These apparently discrepant findings can be 
interpreted within the context of Sedikides (1995) differential sensitivity hypothesis, 
which posits that central (relatively high in personal descriptiveness) and peripheral 
(relatively low in personal descriptiveness) self-conceptions are differentially influenced 
by mood. Peripheral self-conceptions are argued to be subject to the mood-congruency 
bias, whereas central self-conceptions are unaffected by mood. Participants in Sedikides 
study were induced into either a sad, neutral or happy mood state and then later 
completed behaviour and trait self-descriptiveness ratings. The MIPs employed were 
quite similar to the non self-referent ones used in the present study. Sedikides explicitly 
stated that the other-directed, outward attentional focused MIPs were chosen to preclude 
the possibility of confounding between the effects of mood and the unwanted effects of 
the mood-induction task (i.e., increased attentional focus on the self). Results supported 
the differential sensitivity hypothesis, for only the behaviour and trait descriptions that 
were initially rated as peripheral were influenced by mood. Central self-evaluations were 
quite stable. The current author proposes, however, that if the MIPs had been self­
referent, then the central self-conceptions would also have been influenced through 
cognitive priming o f self-schema. Peripheral self-conceptions would continue to be 
subject only to mood-congruency effects, however, even under self-referent MIPs.
1
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This framework can be adapted to the perceptual body image domain. Actual 
estimates are akin to central self-conceptions, whereas ideal estimates are akin to 
peripheral self-conceptions for they are by definition low in personal descriptiveness. 
Perhaps the ideal can be conceptualized as separate from the self-schema and more of an 
external percept. In this context, then a mood-congruency effect would be predicted 
only for ideal estimates after exposure to non self-referent MIPs that created a change in 
mood. This was found for the ideal estimates of participants in the negative non self­
referent MIP (p. = .028), and neared significance for participants in the negative self­
referent condition (p= .06). The greater magnitude of change for ideal estimates of the 
negative non self-referent MIP, relative to the negative self-referent MIP, mirrors the 
greater magnitude of change in affect for these MIP conditions. Since the positive MIPs 
did not result in a significant mood change there were no observed mood-congruency 
effects for ideal estimates.
Actual body size estimations (central self-conceptions) would be predicted to be 
unaffected by the non-self-referent MIPs, which occurred, but affected by the self­
referent MIPs, which occurred for the positive condition (p = .035) and approached 
significance for the negative condition (p = .098). The results of the perceptual domain, 
once framed within the context of central and peripheral self-evaluations, are interpreted 
as supporting the cognitive priming perspective. Further investigations should be 
conducted with larger samples to determine if these patterns of results are replicable or 
spurious. The attitudinal variables argued to support the cognitive priming perspective 
are also considered to be central self-conceptions.
Why did ideal estimates increase for the negative conditions? Past research 
provides inconsistent results for this perceptual measure but when significant change was
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reported, ideal estimates decreased under negative self-referent conditions (Taylor & 
Cooper, 1992). Participants who initially reported high body image concern had higher 
BMI ratings, and as such, induction into a negative mood may have lead them to re­
evaluate unrealistic ideals which seemed even harder to obtain while in a negative mood 
compared to normal mood conditions. This suggestion is tentative and further analyses 
would determine if this effect was replicable with larger sample sizes.
The positive, self-referent MIP may indeed lead to increased self-focus which 
runs coimter to past arguments advanced by Wood et al. (1990). These arguments, 
however, were based on investigation of change in self-esteem related to positive MIP 
effects. Self-esteem has been argued to be a more stable aspect o f the self-schema 
relative to self-evaluations (Brown & Mankowski, 1993). The observed improvements in 
actual body size estimates, evaluative and investment body image attitudes, after 
exposure to the positive self referent MIP, are of particular interest in light of the fact that 
the only mood change associated with this condition was a trend of decreased negative 
affect, (p = .052). These collective results offer strong support for the cognitive priming 
perspective by suggesting that positive thoughts, independent of a significant decrease in 
negative affect, may improve some body image concerns.
Self-Esteem Domain
Recall that Brown and Mankowski (1993) distinguish between self-appraisals or 
self-evaluations and self-esteem, positing that self-evaluations show greater fluctuation 
across time and situations than do general feelings o f self-worth. Self-esteem, therefore, 
may be less likely to be affected by momentary events such as those brought about by 
changes in mood or priming o f negative self-schema.
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Wood’s (1990) argument that positive mood does not increase self-focus was 
derived from an investigation of self-esteem, and the current study’s results support this 
assertion for the positive-self condition had no influence on either the high or low self­
esteem groups. Self-evaluations, however, appear to fluctuate more across situations, as 
proposed by Brown and Mankowski (1993), and are influenced by positive MIPs, but 
these effects are most likely due to cognition, and not momentary mood states.
Past research (Brown & Mankowski, 1993) has shown that individuals who report 
low self-esteem are more readily influenced by negative MIPs. Our results, however, 
indicate the opposite with observed fluctuations in self-esteem; largely appearance and 
performance, for participants who initially reported high self-esteem. Conversely, 
stability was found for participants in the low self-esteem subgroup. Similar to the 
sensitivity analysis performed on the perceptual domain, further investigations must 
replicate these contradictory findings with larger sample sizes before more than tentative 
conclusions can be offered.
Based on the arguments advanced by the cognitive perspective the current author 
proposes a potential rationale for the specific mechanisms underlying the current study’s 
observed results. Negative self-referent statements directly prime a general, negative 
self-schema. This self-schema includes central self-evaluations and feelings of self- 
worth of varying stability. Body image evaluations are responsive to these negative 
thoughts about the self and are therefore made more accessible via cognitive priming. 
Positive thoughts about the self have less impact on the more stable self-worth but can 
influence the labile self-evaluations. Cognitive priming does not occur for peripheral 
traits because these evaluations are not embedded within the self-schema. Body is 
hypothesized to be influenced by internal cues, via cognition, that may originate from
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external sources but subsequently prime internal schemas. Although mood changes 
often accompany these cognitions, subjective mood does not appear to have the ability to 
influence self-evaluations.
Implications
The current study has theoretical implications for cognitive researchers that 
extend beyond the domain of body image. The present investigation answers a call by 
Rector, Segal, and Gemar (1998) for future research to clarify the importance of self­
reference in cognitive studies. These authors report that,
there is still insufficient data to support the central tenet of the 
cognitive model that schemas are the critical causal elements of 
the (depression) disorder.... Future research is required to pursue 
methodologies that activate cognitive dysfunction and then show 
that this cognitive activation actually predicts the onset of the 
disorder prospectively. (p. 221.)
The overlap between depression and body image disturbances allows the present 
study to shift the proposed focus from an examination of depressive disorders to an 
examination of how cognitive schemas, specifically self-schemas, maintain or exacerbate 
body image concerns.
Results hold possible applied implications for some body image concerns appear 
to decrease through increasing positive self thoughts. The area of upward social 
comparisons may be a beneficial area of future research for treatment of body image 
disturbances. Having body concerned individuals down grade the relative importance of 
some of their evaluations may lead to decreased affective attitudes.
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My signature on this sheet indicates that I agree to participate in a study assessing the 
impact of emotional experiences on peoples’ perceptions. Signing this form also 
indicates that I understand the following:
1. I am a volunteer and can withdraw at any time from the study without penalty.
2. There are no physical or psychological risks associated with participation
3. The data I provide will be confidential
4. I may receive a summary of the project, upon request, following the 
completion of the study.
Name of the participant (please print) Signature of the participant
Student Number Date
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Beck Depression Inventory 
EDI
This questionnaire consists of 21 groups of statements. After reading each group of statements 
careftUly, circle the number (0,1,2 or 3) next to the one statement in each group which best 
describes the way you have been feeling the past week, including today. If several 
statements within a group seem to apply equally well, circle each one. Be sure to read all the 
statements in each group before making your choice.
1 0 I do not feel sad.
1 I feel sad.
2 I am sad all the time and I can't snap out of it.
3 I am so sad or unhappy that I can’t stand it.
2 0 I am not particularly discouraged about the future.
1 I feel discouraged about the future.
2 I feel I have nothing to look forward to.
3 I feel that the future is hopeless and that things cannot improve.
3 0 I do not feel like a failure.
1 I fee ll have failed more than the average person.
2 As I look back on my life, all I can see is a lot of failures.
3 I feel I am a complete failure as a person.
4 0 I get as much satisfaction out of things as I used to.
1 I don't enjoy things the way I used to.
2 I don't get real satisfaction out of anything anymore.
3 I am dissatisfied or bored with everything.
S O I  don't feel particularly guilty.
1 I feel guilty a good part of the time.
2 I feel quite guilty most of the time.
3 I feel guilty all of the time.
6 0 1 don't feel I am being punished.
1 I feel I may be punished.
2 I expect to be punished.
3 I feel I am being punished.
7 0 1 don't feel disappointed in myself.
1 I am disappointed in myself.
2 I am disgusted with myself.
3 I hate myself.












































1 don't feel 1 am any worse than anybody else.
1 am critical of myself for my weaknesses or mistakes.
1 blame myself all the time for my faults.
1 blame myself for everything bad that happens.
I don't have any thoughts of killing myself.
1 have thoughts of killing myself, but I would not carry them out.
I would like to kill myself.
1 would kill myself if 1 had the chance.
1 don't cry any more than usual.
1 cry more now than I used to.
1 cry all the time now.
1 used to be able to cry, but now I can't cry even though I want to.
1 am no more irritated now than I ever am.
1 get annoyed or irritated more easily than 1 used to.
1 feel irritated all the time now.
I don't get irritated at all by the things that used to irritate me.
I have not lost interest in other people.
1 am less interested in other people than 1 used to be.
I have lost most of my interest in other people.
1 have lost all of my interest in other people.
1 make decisions about as well as I ever could.
1 put off making decisions more than I used to.
1 have greater difficulty in making decisions than before.
1 can't make decisions at all anymore.
1 don't feel I look any worse than I used to.
1 am worried that I am looking old or unattractive.
I feel that there are permanent changes in my appearance that make me look 
unattractive.
I believe that I look ugly.
I can work about as well as before.
It takes an extra effort to get started at doing something.
I have to push myself very hard to do anything.
I can't do any work at all.
I can sleep as well as usual.
I don't sleep as well as I used to.
I wake up 1-2 hours earlier than usual and find it hard to get back to sleep.
I wake up several hours earlier than I used to and cannot get back to sleep.
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17 0 I don't get more tired than usual.
1 I get tired more easily than I used to.
2 I get tired h'om doing almost anything.
3 I am too tired to do anything.
18 0 My appetite is no worse than usual.
1 My appetite is not as good as it used to be.
2 My appetite is much worse now.
3 1 have no appetite at all anymore.
19 0 I haven't lost much weight, if any, lately.
1 I have lost more than 5 pounds.
2 I have lost more than 10 pounds.
3 I have lost more than IS pounds.
I am purposely trying to lose weight by eating less. Yes  No__
20 0 I am no more worried about my health than usual.
1 I am worried about physical problems such as aches and pains; or upset
stomach; or constipation.
2 I am very worried about physical problems and it's hard to think of much else.
3 I am so worried about my physical problems that I cannot think about anything
else.
2 1 0  1 have not noticed any recent change in my interest in sex.
1 I am less interested in sex than I used to be.
2 I am much less interested in sex now.
3 I have lost interest in sex completely.
! ' [
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Each item on this questionnaire deals with a different physical characteristic. 
For each characteristic, think about how you would describe yourself as you 
actually are. Then think about how you wish y o u  were. The difference between 
the two reveals how close you come to your personal ideal. In some instances, 
your looks may closely match your ideal. In other instances, they may differ 
considerably. On Part A of each item, you will rate how much you resemble your 
personal physical ideal by circling the number on the 0 to 3 scale.
Your physical ideals may differ in how important they are to you, regardless 
of how close you come to having them. You may feel strongly that some ideals 
embody the way you want to look or to be. In other areas, your ideals may be less 
important to you. On Part B of each item, rate how important your ideal is to you 
by circling the number on the 0 to 3 scale.
1. A. My ideal height is;
0 1 2 3
Exactly Almost 





B. How important to you is your ideal height? 







A. My ideal skin complexion is: 
0 1 2 3
Exactly Almost 





B. How important to you is your ideal skin complexion? 
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3. A. My ideal hair texture and thickness are;
0 1 2
Exactly Almost Fairly Very
As I Am As I Am Unlike Me Unlike Me
B. How important to you are your ideal hair texture and thickness?
0 1 2 3
Not Somewhat Moderately Very
Important Important Important Important
4. A. My ideal facial features (eyes, nose, ears, facial shape) are:
0 1 2 3
Exactly Almost Fairly Very
As I Am As I Am Unlike Me Unlike Me
B. How important to you are your ideal facial features?
0 1 2 3
Not Somewhat Moderately Very
Important Important Important Important
5. A. My ideal muscle tone and definition is:
0 1 2 3
Exactly Almost Fairly Very
As I Am As I Am Unlike Me Unlike Me
B. How important to you is your ideal muscle tone and definition?
0 1 2 3
Not Somewhat Moderately Very
Important Important Important Important
!
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B. How important to you are your ideal body proportions? 









7. A. My ideal weight is:









B. How important to you is your ideal weight? 









8. A. My ideal chest size is:









B. How important to you is your ideal chest size? 
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B. How important to you is your ideal physical coordination?



















B. How important to you is your overall physical appearance?
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icfcuaRTTrrrnNSî This is a scale which measures a variew of personal opinions and feelings about 
your own body weight and shape. THERE ARE NO RIGHT OR WRONG ANSWERS SO TRY 
VERY HARD TO BE COMPLETELY HONEST IN YOUR ANSWERS. Read each statement care­
fully. For each statement fill in the square with the response that best represents your opinion or 
feeling. Make sure that your answer is in the correct box.
SD »  Strongly Disagree; D «  Disagree; N «  Neutral; A «  Agree; SA «  Strongly Agree
1 I think a lot about my weight or shape. La] LsJ L*J LhI
2 I think that being at the right w e ^ to r  shape leads to greater h^piness in 
my relationships with other people my age. f «a1 LÙ LaJ LaJ LfeJ
3 I think that changing my weight or shape are not high priorities at this point 
in my life. L»] LaJ Qj] LaJ L à
4 I think that changing nw weight or shape is just about the only way I could 
feel bttter about myself at this point in my Ims. L à  t à  LaJ LiJ L à
5 I think that the happiest momeas in my life were mainly due to the feet that I was 
1 at the right weight or shape back then. Là LaJ LaJ LaJ Là
6 1 think I would rather be successful in my work or studies than be successful 
in achieving and maintaining the rêtht weight or shape. Là LaJ LaJ LaJ Là
7 I think that my weight or shape will have Ihde or no influence on the direction 
that my life takes in the flmue. Là Là LaJ LjlI Là
8 I think that gening to the right wdght or shape makes me a more special person. Là LaJ LaJ LaJ Là
9 I think that my desire to change my weight or shape is more important than 
just about an)^ing else in my life at the moment. Là Là Là Là Là
10 I think that my life would be much better if I were af the right weight or shape. Là Là Là Là Là
11 I think that my weight or shape will have little or no influence on my abillqr 
to achieve the future goals that I have set for myself. là  Là Là Là Là
12 I think that I worry a lot about my weight or shape. Là Là Là Là Là
13 I think that many of the problems I face right now are caused by not being 
at the right weight or shape. Là Là Là Là Là
14 I think that little else could make me happier than achieving or maintaining 
the right weight or shape. C a Q Q Q H
15 1 think that my weight or shape do not greatly influence the way I feel about 
myself as a person. Là Là Là Là Là
16 I think that many of my personal problems would be solved if I could only 
get to the right weight or shape. Là Là Là Là Là
17 I think that my we*ht or shape are not the most ingwrtant parts of nsy 
identity. Là Là Là Là à
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18 I think that my own worth as a person is mainly determined by my weight or 
shape. rà  r D1 [ N1 ^*11 s*i
19 1 think that the good things I have experienced so for have had little to do 
with mv weight or shape. [ 3 1_£J ülI Là S
20 1 think that my main problem right now is my inability to achieve and 
maintain the right weight or shape. Fsol [_oJ [_iJ Là là
21 I think that other people my age don’t really care about my weight or shape. r sol Là Là Là là
22 I think that I would become a more valuable person if I were able to achieve or 
maintain the right weight or shape. Là Là Là Là Là
23 I feel insecure about my weight or shape. Là Là Là Là à
24 1 feel great about my weight or shape. Là Là Là Là Là
25 I feel negative about my weight or shape. Là Là à  Là à
26 I feel humiliated about my weight or shape. Là Là à  Là Là
27 I feel unhappy about my weight or shape. Là Là Là Là Là
28 I feel comfortable about my weight or shape. Là Là à  à  Là
29 I feel dissatisfied about my weight or shape. Là Là Là Là Là
30 I feel secure about my weight or shape. Là Là Là à  Là
31 I feel terrible about my weight or shape. Là Là Là Là à
32 I feel proud about my weight or shape. Là Là Là à  (à
33 I feel bad about my weight or shape. Là Là à  Là Là
34 I feel happy about my weight or shape. Là Là Là Là Là
35 1 feel satisfied about my weight or shape. Là à  à  Là Là
36 I feel nervous about my weight or shape. Là Là Là Là Là
37 I feel uncomfortable about my weight or shape. Là Là à  à  Là
38 I feel relaxed about my weight or shape. Là Là à  Là Là
39 I feel good about my weight or shape. Là Là à  Là Là
40 I feel positive about my weight or shape. Là là  à  Là Là
41. Yburase: 1 II 1 years
42. Vbur height: 1 1 feet and 1 II 1 inches [Guess if you don’t know]
43. Your current weieht: 1 ll II 1 pounds [Guess if you don’t know)
44. What uouJd be the right weight for \ou: 1 II II 1 pounds
45. Your sex: 1 1 female or I I male
































































Body Image Assessment Scale





























































Body Image Assessment Scale




This is a questionnaire designed to measure what you are thinking at this moment. There is, 
of course, no right answer for any statement. The best answer is what you feel is true of 
yourself at this moment. Be sure to answer all of the items, even if you are not certain of the 
best answer. Again, answer these questions as they are true for you RIGHT NOW.
1 = Not at All
2 = A Little Bit
3 = Somewhat
4 = Very Much
5 = Extremely
1. I feel confident about my abilities. 2 3 4 5
2. I am worried about whether I am regarded as a success or failure. 2 3 4 5
•3. I feel satisfîed with the way my body looks right now. 2 3 4 5
4. I feel frustrated or rattled about my performance. 2 3 4 5
5. I feel that I am having trouble understanding things that I read. 2 3 4 5
6. I feel that others respect and admire me. 2 3 4 5
7. I am dissatisfied with my weight. 2 3 4 5
8. I feel self-conscious. 2 3 4 5
9. I feel as smart as others. 2 3 4 5
10. I feel displeased with myself. 2 3 4 5
11. I feel good about myself. 2 3 4 5
12. I am pleased with my tqipearance right now. 2 3 4 5
13. I am worried about what other people think of me. 2 3 4 5
14. I feel confident that I understand things. 2 3 4 5
15. I feel inferior to others at this moment 2 3 4 5
16. I feel unattractive. 2 3 4 5
17. I feel concerned about the impression I am making. 2 3 4 5
18. I feel that I have less scholastic abiliQr right now than others. 2 3 4 5
19. I feel like I'm not doing well. 2 3 4 5
20. I am worried about looking foolish. 2 3 4 5





Please answer these questions honestly according to the way you usually feel. Please answer each 







h & 1 sCO < GO
1. 1 feel that I’m a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others.
2. I feel that I have a number of good qualities.
3. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.
4. 1 am able to do things as well as most people.
5. 1 feel I do not have much to be proud of.
6. 1 take a positive attitude toward myself.
7. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.
8. I wish I could have more respect for myself.
9. 1 certainly feel useless at times.
10. At times I think I am no good at all.
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Appendix K
Positive Self-Referent Mood Induction Procedure
Happy Mood Induction Scale
1. Being in college makes my dreams more possible.
2. The world is hill o f opportunity and I'm taking advantage or it.
3 .1 know if I try I can make things turn out fine.
4 .1 bet things will go well for the rest of the day.
5 When I have the right attitude, nothing can depress me.
6. Most people like me.
7. I've got some good fHends.
8. My parents brag about me to their fHends.
9 .1 know I can get the things I want in life.
10. My future is so bright I have to wear shades.
11.1 feel creative.
12.1 can make things happen
13. Nothing can bum me out now.
14. Things look totally awesome.
15. The relationships I have now are the best I've ever had.
16. It doesn't get any better than this.
17.1 can make any situation turn out right.
18.1 feel completely aware.
19. I'm in charge of my like and I like it that way.
20. Life's a blast, I can't remember when I felt so good.
21. I'm going to have it all!
22. When it comes right down to it. I'm just too cool.
23 .1 know I can do it; I'm going to seize the day!
24. I'm energized
25. It's great to be alive!
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Appendix L
Negative Self-Referent Mood Induction Procedure
Sad Mood Induction Scale
1.1 feel a little down today.
2. my classes are harder than I expected.
3. Everyone else seems to be having more fun.
4. Sometimes I feel so guilty that I can't sleep.
5 .1 wish I could be myself but nobody likes me when I am.
6. Today is one of those days when everything I do is wrong.
7 .1 doubt that I'll ever make a contribution to the world.
8 .1 feel like my life is in a rut that I'm never going to get out of.
9. My mistakes haunt me, Fve made too many.
10. Life is such a heavy burden
11. I'm tired of trying.
12. Even when I give my best effort, it just doesn't seem to be good enough.
13. Nobody understands me or even tries to.
14.1 don't think things are ever going to get better.
15. I feel worthless.
16. What's the point of trying?
17. My parents don't know who I am.
18. When I talk no one really listens.
19.1 feel cheated by life.
20. Why should I try when I can't make a difference anyway?
21. Sometimes I feel really guilty about the way I've treated my parents.
22. Every time I turn around, something else had gone wrong.
23. I'm completely alone.
24. There is no hope.
25 .1 feel I am being suffocated by the weight of my past mistakes.
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Appendix M
Instructions for the Self-Referent Mood Induction Procedures
INSTRUCTIONS
1. I will be reading a series of cards with statements typed on them. These statements represent a mood 
state. In order to participate fully and successfully, I will need to be willing to feel and experience 
each statement as it would apply to me personally. In other words, when I read each statement, I 
will allow myself to respond as though the statement had been my own original thought. I will go 
with the feeling and not try to stop it.
2. I will read each of the following statements to myself and then I will read the statement aloud.
: 3. At first I might feel like resisting the mood. However, I will see that it is the case that I have the 
opportunity to learn to talk myself into a mood, and obviously, 1 will also learn how to talk myself 
out of one. When this happens, I will find that I have learned something valuable about myself; I 
can learn to control my moods. Thus, I will try to experience the mood suggested.
! 4. I will feel each item, making the statement my own. I will experience the mood suggested and will 
not attempt to stop it. I will visualize a scene in which I have had such a feeling or thought. Then I 
will begin to say whatever comes to mind that relates to the feeling. This is a type o f free 
association -  letting thoughts that pertain to the feeling flow freely.
5. I am now ready to experience the statements that follow. From this point forward whenever I hear 
the tone on the tape recorder, I will go on to the next page. I will spend the time between the tones 
reading the statements and experiencing the feelings they suggest to me. I am ready to begin.
PLEASE PRESS PLAY ON THE TAPE RECORDER NOW AND TURN 
THE PAGE TO BEGIN READING THE FOtST STATEMENT.
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Appendix N
Instructions for the Non Self-Referent Mood Induction Procedures
INSTRUCTIONS
1. You will be viewing a series of images that are accompanied by short stories. You 
will use these images to help guide your imagination in the creation of a story that is 
centered around a close, male friend.
2. You will be instructed to think about the thoughts and feelings of your male friend 
who is the main character in the story. You will also be instructed to write about the 
thoughts and feelings of this male friend. Please remember to focus on the thoughts 
and feelings of your friend and not your own.
3. These stories are designed to induce a mood state. In order to participate fully and 
successfully, you will need to be willing to feel and experience the mood suggested 
by the stories. You will go with the feeling and not try to stop it.
4. At first you might feel like resisting the mood. However, you will see that it is the 
case that you have the opportunity to use your imagination to get yourself into a 
mood, and obviously, you will also learn to use your imagination to get yourself out 
of one. When this happens, you will find that you have learned something valuable 
about yourself; you can learn to control your moods. Thus, you will try to experience 
the mood suggested.
5. You will become involved in each story and experience the mood suggested and not 
attempt to stop it. You will visualize the scenes depicted by the images; using sights, 
smells, and sounds, and concentrate on the thoughts and feelings of your male friend 
that come to mind. This is a type of free association -  letting thoughts that pertain to 
the feeling flow freely.
6. You are now ready to engage in the guided imagery process. From this point forward 
you will use your imagination to create a story and experience the feelings they 
suggest to you. You are ready to begin.
PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO BEGIN READING THE 
STORY AND VIEWING THE IMAGES.
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